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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the refinements of Nash equilibrium in two person signaling game 
experiments. The experimental games cover the watershed of the nested refinements: Bayes-Nash, 
Sequential, Intutitive, Divine, Universally Divine, NWBR, and Stabel. In each game an equilbrium 
selection problem is defined in which adjacent refinements are considered. 
The pattern of outcomes suggest that individuals select the more refined equilibria up to the 
divinity concept. However, an anomaly occurs in the game in which the stable equilbrium is a clear 
preference among the subjects. Since the concepts are nested this suggests that the outcomes are 
game specific. Sender behavior does not seem to follow any specific decision rule (e.g., Nash, 
minmax, PIR, etc.) while receiver actions tend to correspond to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. 
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In a noncooperative game a Nash equilibrium point is a set of strategies, one for each player,
which are best responses to each other. The Nash concept has many virtues. It always exists in finite 
games and is intuitively appealing, precise and simple to teach and apply. Indeed, the Nash concept 
seems too simple in many games, especially those with complicated dynamics and information 
structure because it permits equilibrium points which seem implausible or illogical. Many game 
theorists have tried to sharpen the Nash concept by proposing logical rules stronger than the mutual­
best-response requirement which strategies must satisfy. These rules are called "refinements" of 
Nash equilibrium. 
There are remarkably few data guiding the theoretical process of refinement. This paper 
attempts to fill that gap by testing various refinements experimentally in two-player signaling games
with one-sided incomplete infonnation. Equilibrium refinements have been applied to signaling 
games in many areas including finance (Harris and Raviv, 1985), choice of product quality 
(Grossman, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986), education (Spence, 1974), bargaining (Rubinstein, 
1985) and predatory pricing (Selten, 1978; Kreps and Wilson, 1982b; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1982a,b). Fudenberg and Tirole (1987) review some of the many applications. 
Our experiments test six refinements: sequentiality (Kreps and Wilson, 1982a); the intuitive 
criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987); divinity and universal divinity (Banks and Sobel, 1987); the never-
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a-weak-best-response (NWBR) criterion (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986); and stability (Kohlberg and
Mertens, 1986). 
We constructed two games to test for Nash behavior and six games to test the refinements 
against each other. In each of the six games there are two equilibria, one more refined and one less 
refined; e.g., a Nash equilibrium which is not sequential and a Nash equilibrium which is sequential. 
An alternative, more conservative approach would be to pick one refinement and study it in 
a variety of games with different parameters. But if subjects then consistently choose th e  more 
refined of two equilibria we will not know whether they would choose even more refined equilibria if 
they were available. Our experiments avoid this shortcoming. 
Furthermore our experiment does test each refinement in a variety of games with different
parameters. Because the sets of equilibria are nested, (all sequential equilibria are Nash, all intuitive
equilibria are sequential, etc.), our experiments thus test each refinement in several games. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we define several refinements and 
illustrate them with the games used in the experiments, in section 3 we describe the experimental 
design, in section 4 we report results, and section 5 is a conclusion with ideas for further research. 
2. A PRIMER ON REFINEMENTS
In the generic form of a signaling game there are two players, a sender S and a receiver R . 
The sender S has private information summarized by his type t ET. Knowing his type S selects a 
message m EM which R observes before choosing an action a EA. R does not know t before 
making his choice, but his beliefs about t are characterized by a prior probability distribution P (t) 
over the set T which is common knowledge. Preferences for S and R are represented by von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions u (t, m, a) and v (t , m ,  a), respectively. The sets T, M, A 
are assumed to be finite. 
For any finite set K let !!.K denote the set of all probability distributions over K. A signaling
strategy for S is a function from types into messages 
q : T --> !!.M, 
where q (m I t) denotes the probability that S sends the message m given type t .  A response
strategy for R is a function from messages into actions 
where r (a I m) denotes the probability that R takes action a in response to the message m . Since 
u 0 and v 0 are assumed to be von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, we can extend the 
utility functions u and v to the strategy spaces associated with !!.A by taking expected values. 
For any AE!!.r and m EM, define the best response correspondence for R by 
BR (A,, m) = argmax '£ v (t , m, r (m ))·'A(t)reAA teT 
and for any A c !!.r let
BR (A, m) = U BR ('A , m). A.EA 
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The concept of Nash equilibrium provides the starting place for analysis in games of 
complete information. The generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept of games of incomplete 
information in which signaling games are a subset is Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1967-
68). 
Definition.1 A Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of strategies q, r, and beliefsµ(· I m )E !!.y such
that 
i) 'it E T, q (m' I t) > 0 only if
u(t,m',r(m'))= maxu(t,m,r(m)) meM 
ii) 'i m E M s. t. q (m I t) > 0 for some t E T, r (a' Im)> 0 only if
L v(t,m,a')·µ(tl m)= max LV(t,m,a)·µ(tlm): aeA teT 
iii) 'i m E M s. t. q (m It)> 0 for some t E T, 
(t' lm)= q(m lt')·p(t') µ 
Lq(mlt) .P(t)tET 
Part i) of the definition says that the signaling strategy of S is optimal for each type t E T given the 
response strategy of R. Part ii) says that R is selecting actions optimally for messages which are 
sent with positive probability ("along the equilibrium path"). Part iii) says that R uses Bayes' rule to 
update the prior belief P E !!.r after observing the message m knowing the sender's signaling
strategy q. 
Consider the signaling game depicted in Table 1. The payoffs in the matrices are
u (t, m, a) and v ( t, m , a). Each part of the table represents payoffs for a different message
(mi. m2, or m3) for the possible types (t1 and ti) and actions (a1 a2, and a3). We assume
throughout thatP (t1) =P (t2) = .5. In game 1 there is a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium path2 
generated by the following strategies: q (m1It;)=1, i = l, 2, and r(a1Im1) = r(a3 lmi) = 
r (a 11 m3) = 1. This is a pooling equilibrium because both types send the same message (m 1). No
information about S's type is revealed by the message, so µ(t; Im 1) = P (t 1) = .5, i = 1, 2. 
1. Although Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is usually not defined explicitly with respect to R's beliefs, defining it this way
makes it easy to compare with the more refined equilibrium concepts discussed below. 
2. That is, there are other Bayesian-Nash equilibria, but they are the same along the equilibrium path.
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Table 1: Game 1, Unique Nash Pooling 
m1 a1 az a3 mz a, az a3 m3 a, az a3 
11 2,1 2,0 0,2 11 3,1 1,0 0,0 1, 1,2 1,1 3,0 
lz 1,3 2,0 2,1 lz 2,1 0,0 0,6 lz 0,2 3,1 1,1 
• - Nash equilibrum path.
The game in Table 2 has a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium which is separating (each type 
sends a different message). Hence, upon observing either equilibrium message R can infer S's 
type. The equilibrium strategies are q (m1I11) = q (m211z) = 1 and r(a 11 m1) = r(a2 lm2) = 
r(a2l m3) = I. 
Table 2: Game 2, Unique Nash Separating 
m, a, az a3 mz a, az a3 m3 a, az a3 
11 2,3" 1,1 2,2 1, 0,3 0,2 3,1 1, 1,2 0,3 3,1 
lz 1,1 3,1 0,3 lz 1,0 2,2• 1,1 lz 1,3 1,2 3,2 
n - Nash equilibrium path. 
In games 1 and 2 the Bayesian-Nash equilibriun1 prediction is unique. However, in many 
games there is more than one equilibrium, and hence the theoretical prediction is ambiguous. 
Several game theorists have proposed refinements of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium concept criteria 
which select equilibria that satisfy certain rationality restrictions, thus giving more precise 
behavioral predictions. 
The most common criticism of the Bayeshian Nash equilibriun concept is that it does not 
restrict R's choice of actions "off the equilibrium path," that is, for m EM such that 
q (m I I)= 0 V 1 E T. Since the choice of signaling strategy endogeneously determines which
messages are off the equilibrium path, "perverse" out-of-equilibrium behavior can generate 
implausible equilibrium predictions. One selection criterion rules out equilibria in which behavior 
off the equilibrium path is not optimal according to some belief about the type of S. For signaling 
games this criterion is equivalent to the sequential equilibrium concept of Kreps and Wilson (1982a). 
Definition. A sequential equilibrium consists of strategies q, r and beliefsµ(· Im) E AT such that 
conditions i) and iii) of the definition of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium hold and condition ii) is 
replaced by: 
ii) Vm EM, r(a'lm)> O only if 
LV(l,m,a')-µ(1lm) = max LV(l,m,a)-µ(1lm). aeA teT 
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Table 3 shows a game in which there are two Bayesian-Nash equilibria, only one of which is 
sequential. The Bayesian-Nash equilibria which is not sequential is q (m 11 t; ) = 1 ,  i = 1 ,  2 and
r(a21m1) = 1, r(a2 lmz ) = 1, r(a21 m3) = I . There is no belief over T which makes the action a2 
optimal following m3 . However, if R plays a response involving only a1 and a3 rather than az, S 
will send the message m3 rather than m 1 , thus upsetting the equilibrium. The unique sequential
equilibrium for this game is q (m3 It;)= 1, i = 1 ,  2, and r(a21m2)=1 ,  r(a2 lmz ) = 1 ,  r(a 1Im3) = 1 .
Table 3: Game 3, Sequential vs. Nash 
m1 a1 a� a3 mz a1 az a3 m3 a1 az a3 
t1 1,2 2,2 0,3 t1 1,2 1,1 2,1 t1 3,1 0,0 2,1 
tz 2,2 1 ,4 3, 2 t2 2,2 0,4 3,1 t2 2,2 0,0 2,1 
s - sequential equilibrium path, n - Nash equilibrium path.
The sequential equilibrium concept refines Bayesian-Nash equilibria by requiring that out­
of-equilibrium responses be suported by some belief. However, these beliefs might themselves be
unreasonable. The equilibrium refinements proposed by Cho and Kreps (1 987) and Banks and Sobel
(1 987) require beliefs to reflect some thought about which types are likely to benefit from a
particular defection. 
Consider the game in Table 4. There is a sequential equilibria with q (m2 It; ) = 1, i = 1 ,  2, 
and r(a 1 lm1) = r(a31 m2)= r(a21m3) =I. To support this equilibrium µ(t1 lm1) must be greater
than �; R must believe that the out-of-equilibrium message m 1 is more likely to have been sent by
t1 than by t2 . (Recall that we assume priors P (t1) =P(tz ) = .5.) However, the equilibrium payoff of
a t 1 type from choosing m 2 is greater than any possible payoff from defecting by choosing m 1 
whereas an a' t2 type could conceivably do better by defecting tom 1 than by sending the
equilibrium message m2. Hence, it seems unreasonable to increase the probability placed on t1 
after observing a defectionm 1 .  Since t1 could not possibly benefit and t2 might, it seems
reasonable to believe a defection was from t2 (i.e., µ(t2Im1) = 1 ) .  Cho and Kreps (1 987) call this
"the intuitive criterion". This belief implies a best response of a2 which provides an incentive for
t 2 to switch and send a message m 1 thus upsetting the equilibrium.
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Table 4: Game 4, Intiutive vs. Sequential 
m1 a1 a� a3 mz a1 az a� m3 a1 az a3
t1 0,3 2, 2 2,1 t1 1 ,2  2,1 3,0 t1 1 ,6 4,1 2,0 
tz 1 ,0 3, 2 2,1 tz 0,1 3,1 2,6 tz 0,0 4, 1 0,6 
i - intuitive equilibrium path, ' - sequential equilibrium path. 
The intuitive criterion can be stated more fonnally. Fix a sequential equilibrium with the 
associated equilibrium payoffs u *(t) for S, and for each out-of-equilibrium message define 
T1(m)={tET: u*(t)> max u(t,m,r)}, 
reBR(A,,m) 
(where the subscript I denotes T (m) defined by the intuitive criterion) and let 
Li1(m)={ AE.Li1 : A.(t)>O only if teT;(m)}. 
Definition. A sequential equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion if for all out-of-equilibrium
messages m, µ(·Im) E Li1(m ). 
For the signaling game in Table 4 the unique sequential equilibrium satisfying the intuitive 
criterion is: q(m1It;)=1, i = 1, 2, and r(a2 lm1) = r(a1 lmz) =r(a1lm3)=1.
The logic of the intuitive criterion can be extended in various ways. Consider the game in 
Table 5 which has the following sequential equilibrium: q (m 21 t;) = 1, 2, and
r(a3Im1) = r (a3 I m2) = r ( a2 1m 1) = 1 .  This equilibrium satisfies the intuitive criterion since
T1(m 1) = tj>, implying that µ(t1Im1) = 1 is contained in Li1(m 1), and a3 is a best response to 
µ(t1Im1) = 1, while T1(m3) = {t; }, and a2 is a best response to µ(t2 I m3) = 1 .  However, given the 
equilibrium payoffs t2 would like to defect from the equilibrium and send the message m 1 for any 
possible response that would make t 1 want to defect, but there are some responses (e.g., a2) for 
which t1 does not want to defect when t2 does. That is, the set of responses to m1 which induce t1 to 
defect are strictly contained in the set which induces t 2 to defect. It seems reasonable to require that 
the belief µ(· Im 1) should assign greater weight (relative to the prior) to t 2 when m 1 is observed. 
This restriction is implied by the concept of divine equilibria (Banks and Sobel, 1 987) . 
Table 5: Game 5, Divine vs. Intiutive 
m1 a1 az a3 mz a1 a2 a� m3 af az a3 
t1 4, 0 0,3 0, 4 t1 2,0 0,3 3, 2 t1 2,3 1 ,0 1, 2 
t2 3,4 3,3 1 ,0 tz 0,3 0,0 3, 2 t2 4,3 0, 4 3,0 
i - intuitive equilibrium path, d - divine equilibrium path. 
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Fix an equilibrium with S payoffs u *(t) and let m be an out-of-equilibrium message. For 
all r E ti A define 
j 1 if u(t,m, r)>u*(t) 
µ(t ,r : m) = [0,l] if u (t, m, r) = u *(t) 
0 if u(t,m, r)<u*(t) 
as the frequency that t E T would send m if m induces a response of r. Let 
I'(r, m) = {yEL'lr : 3 µ(t) E µ(t, r) and C > 0 s.ty(t) = C·µ(t)·P(t) 'i tET},
where C is a constant normalizing the expression into the form of a probability. r(r, m) is the set of 
beliefs consistent with R responding to m with r where each t has the option of obtaining u *(t) or 
u (t, m , r ). Finally for any set ti i;;; tiA let 
r(ti, m) = convex hull [ u r( r, m )].red 
- -
Note that r(tiA , m) i;;; ti1 (m) so that restricting beliefs to be in r(tiA , m) implies that any 
resulting equilibrium will satisfy the intuitive criterion. Further, if there exists t, t' E T such that 
Jl(t, r, m) = 1 implies Jl(t', r ,  m) = 1 ,  then for allµ Ef(tiA, m), µ(t' / �) > P ((t') , thus satisfying µ(t m P t) 
the logic described above. 
If it is common knowledge that R holds beliefs in I'(tiA , m ), then S should expect the 
message m to induce an action in BR (r(tiA, m ), m ). This suggests the following iterative 
procedure: let 
{ I'(A . -1> m) 
r (m) = r ( )n-1 m 
ifr(Am =I• m) ;C $ 
else 
where A. = BR(r.(m) , m) andtid(m) = n r.(m).n 
Definition. A sequential equilibrium is diVine if for all out-of-equilibrium messages 
m,µ(A lm)E tid(m). 
For the game in Table 5 the divine equilibrium is: q (m3 I t;) = 1, i = I, 2, and 
r(a3 lm1) = r(a2 I mz) = r(a 1 lmJ) = I . 
The set of beliefs in !id (m) clearly can depend on the prior belief P ('), since divinity may 
only require that the beliefs assign greater (or equal) weight than the prior on types more likely to 
defect. The requirement that beliefs assign all positive probability to those types which are most 
likely to defect is called "universal divinity". 3 
3. This is equivalent to requiring the out-of-equilibrium beliefs to be divine for all possible priors.
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Consider the signaling game in Table 6. There exists a divine equilibrium of the following 
fonn: a (m3 It;)= 1, i = l, 2 and r(a21 m1) = r(a 11 mz) = r(a1 lm3) = 1. Although t2 is more likely
to defect to m 1 than t 1 since both types could potentially gain from a defection the prior belief 
P (t;) = � is in the set Ad (m 1). Since this belief supports the equilibrium action a 2 the divinity
criterion is satisfied. However, universal divinity requires us to place positive probability only on t2 
because t2 wants to defect whenever t1 does, but not vice versa (e.g., t2 would defect, but t1 
would not if r(a1Im1)=4,r(a21m1) = . 6) .  That belief implies a best response by R of a1 breaking
the divine equilibrium. The unique universally divine equilibrium for the game in Table 6 is : 
q(m1It;)=1, i = 1, 2, and r(a21m1) = r(a1 lmz) = r(a31mJ) = 1. 
Table 6: Game 6, Universally Divine vs. Divine 
m1 al a� a3 m2 a1 az a3 m3 af az a3 
t1 4,1 2,4 1,5 t1 1,3 3,1 4,2 t1 3,3 0, 0 0,4 
tz 5,6 2,5 2,2 tz 1,3 1,4 3,3 tz 3,4 1,5 0,1
" - universally equilibrium path, d - divine equilibrium path. 
As above, fix an equilibrium and let mEM ·be an out-of-equilibrium message. Let 
Ar={P EAT: P(t)>Oift E T}be the set of all nondegenerate priors overT. Define 
Definition. A sequential equilibrium is univers ally divine if for all out-of-equilibrium messages
m, µ(·I m) E Au(m).
Consider the signaling game in Table 7. There exists a universally divine equilibrium where 
q(m3 It;)= 1, i = 1, 2, and r(a1 lm1) = r(a3 lmz) = r(a21m3) = 1. At message m2 there are 
responses by R which make t1 want to defect while t2 does not (e.g., r(a21 m2) = ; , r(a3 I mz) = � 
and there are responses such that t2 wants to defect while t1 would not (e.g., r(a 11 m z) = 1) . 
Hence, universal divinity does not place any restrictions onµ(· I mz). The set of best responses 
following m2 which sustain the equilibrium are r(a1 l mz) =0, r(a2 lmz) s; �, r(a3 lm2) � � (no
belief supports mixing between a 1 and a3). The interior boundary of this set is r(a2 I m2) = �, 
r (a3 I m2) = �; this strategy makes t 1 indifferent between staying along the equilibrium path and 
defecting while t2 would prefer the equilibrium path. Hence, we can think of t1 as the most likely 
type to defect if we define "most likely" as those types for which the set of equilibrium strategies 
includes an out-of-equilibrium strategy for which lhe type has a weak-best response of staying along 
the equilibrium path. 
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Table 7: Game 7, Universally Divine vs. NWBR
m1 a1 az a3 mz af az a3 m3 a1 a� a3 
t1 2,2 0,3 5,2 t1 1,6 5. 3 1,0 t1 2,1 3,3 0,4 
tz 0,2 2,0 5,1 tz 4,0 4,1 0,2 tz 1,4 3,3 2,1 
N - NWBR equilibrium path, " - universally divine equilibrium path.
Fix an equilibrium where m is an out-of-equilibrium message and define
Tn (m) = {tET : 't/ r E BR (Ar. m) s.t. ;:i(t, r) = [0, 1]3 t' ET s.t. ;:i(t', r) = l}.
If t E Tn (m) then if t is ever indifferent between staying along the equilibrium path and defecting
there always exists some other type t' which strictly prefers to defect. In the above example
t2 = Tn (m2), since t2 is only indifferent when r(a2 I m2) = ! , r(a3 I mz) = � , and this strategy
gives t 1 the incentive to defect. Define
An (m) ={A.EAT ; A.(t) > 0 only if ti! T. (m) }. 
Definition. A sequential equilibrium satisfies the never-a-weak-best resp onse (NWBR) criterion if
for all out-of-equilibrium messages m µ(·Im) E An (m ) .  
The unique sequential equilibrium satisfying NWBR for the signaling game in Table 7 is:
a(m21t;)=1, i = 1, 2, and r(a2 lm1) = r(a1 lmz) = r(a31m3) = 1. 
Universal divinity and NWBR were initially attempts to characterize the restrictiveness of 
the concept of stable equilibrium (Kohlberg and Mattens, 1986) in signaling games. The stable
equlibrium concept requires that every possible "tremble" of strategies have an equilibrium "close 
to" the candidate equilibrium. Since for signaling games there is a one-to-one relationship between 
trembles of signaling strategies and beliefs we can discuss stability in terms of every possible out­
of-equilibrium belief generating a nearby equilibrium. Table 8 consists of a game which
demonstrates that NWBR does not completely capture stability. Consider the following sequential 
equilibrium: q (m1 It;)= l ,  i = l, 2, and r(a2 lm1) = r(a1 I mz) = r(a2 I m3) = 1. This equilibrium
satisfies NWBR. At m2 there exists a response strategy making t1 indifferent while t2 prefers the
equilibrium, namely (r(a1 lm2) = �, r(a21mz) = �. Thus, NWBR places no restrictions on
µ(·I mz). (At m3 it is clear that NWBR implies µ(t2 lm3) = 1 supporting the equilibrium path.)
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Table 8: Game 8, Stable vs. NWBR
m1 a 1 a'i a3 m2 a1 a� a3 m3 a1 a2 a3 
t1 1,6 2,5 2,0 t1 0,5 3,4 1,2 t1 4,2 1,1 0.3 
t2 2,0 2,5 0,6 t2 1,2 3,4 0,5 t2 1,2 0,4 3,3 
s - stable equilibrium path, N - NWBR equilibrium path.
To see whether this equilibrium is stable we focus on trembles at m2. If a tremble generates 
a belief µ(t 11 mi!<: : , then a 1 is a best response and the equilibrium path is supported. If� 
µ(t1 I mi)� � then a3 is a best response, and again the equilibrium path is supported. Suppose a
tremble induces a belief µ(11 I m2) e (; , � ); if neither type sends m 2 with positive probability R
respond es with a 2 thus upsetting the equilibrium. What is needed is the ability for one or the other 
type to send m 2 with sufficient probability to make R indifferent between two actions and R to mix 
between the actions in such a way as to make the type(s) indifferent between m 1 and m 2 thus 
rationalizing the original mixing. Hence 11 or 12 must send m2 in such a way as to induce a belief 
of either µ(t1 lmi! = ! or µ(t1 lmi) = ; . At the former R could mix between a2 and a3 and such 
a mix could leave t1 indifferent while 12 prefers the equilibrium path. At the latter R could mix
between a 1 and a2 and such a mix could leave t2 indifferent while 11 prefers the equilibrium path. 
For a tremble inducing a belief in ( � , ; ) if I 1 sends m 2 this would push the belief to µ(t 1) = ; ;
however, this is the belief generating a response leaving t2 indifferent. A similar conclusion holds if 
t 2 would send m2• Thus, a tremble inducing a belief in ( ! , ; ) cannot be stabilized by a judicious
choice of signaling strategy. Note that a necessary condition for such a stabilization in this game is 
that both types be on the boundary of the set of sequential equilibria; that is, stability is a refinement 
of the NWBR equilibrium concept. 
Fix an equilibrium with m being an out-of-equilibrium message and for all J c T define
l(J, m) ={ref.A : u*(I) <: u(t, m, r) ';/ teT and u*(t) =u(t, m, r) if tel};
the set I (J, m) contains those responses making types in J indifferent between the equilibrium path
and m while those in TV prefer the equilibrium path. If a tremble induces a beliefµ at m and only
NWBR types in J send m with positive probability then R's posterior belief at m will be a convex
combination ofµ and e (1 ). Define 
A(J, r, m) = fJ...ef."T : :i'l/,'et.r where re BR (A', m) s. t. A= :E a(t)-e(t) +fl A for a(t) <: 0,tel 
1 - :Ea(t)=�>O};tel 
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A(J, r , m) thus consists of the beliefs that cannot be stabilized by types in J sending m if R 
responds with r .  Define
{ n A(J ,  r ,m) 
rel(J) 
A(J , m)= "1y 
ifl(J) ;t<jl 
else 
and set A *(m) = n A (J, m ). Thus A *(m) consists of those trembles in beliefs that cannot beJcC 
stabilized at the out-of-equilibrium message m. Banks and Sobel (1987) and Cho and Kreps (1987)
provide the following characterization result. 
Theorem. A sequential equilibrium is stable if and only if for all out-of-equilibrium messages
m, A*(m)=<jl. 
In the above example the NWBR equilibrium is not stable since A *(m 2 )  = ( � , � ) ;t <jl .  The unique­
stable equilibrium in this game is q (m21t;)=1, i = 1, 2 and r(a2Im1) = r(a2 I mi)= r(a2 lm3 ) = 1.
In summary we have the following nesting of equilibrium concepts: Bayesian Nash ::::i 
Sequential ::::i Intuitive =:Divine ::::i Universally Divine =: NWBR ::::i Stable.
Since Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) prove that every game has at least one stable 
equilibrium and the stable equilibrium is also NWBR, universally divine, etc., existence of each kind 
of less-refined equilibrium is also guaranteed. 
3. EXPERIMENTALDESIGN
Our experimental design uses the games in Tables 1-8 to detennine which refinements 
subjects play most often. Games 1 and 2 test whether subjects play unique Nash equilibria, one 
pooling (game 1) and one separating (game 2). Games 3 to 8 all have two pooling Nash equilibria,
one more refined and one less refined. In addition to the two messages which are equilibrium
choices in games 3 to 8 we include a third message which is not an equilibrium choice. Each game 
then has Nash and non-Nash messages so we can test the robustness of Nash play in several different 
games. 
Our experiment has three goals: 
1. Test for robustness of Nash equilibrium play in several different games.
2. Test whether subjects play more refined equilibria (for several different nested refinements).
3. Test whether decision criteria (other than Nash equilibrium) can explain individual choices.
a. The Experimental Session
The games were presented to subjects in two 3 x 3 payoff tables (see Appendix A for an 
example). Each of their choices were made and communicated on a computer network. 
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An experimental session consisted of many periods. In each period six subjects were
divided into three pairs. One subject in each pair was the sender and the other subject was the 
receiver. To make each play as much like a one-shot game as possible, pairings were random and 
anonymous each period. 
Subjects assigned to be senders were told their type (1  or 2) which was randomly
determined. Receivers did not know the sender's type, but the two types were commonly known to 
be equally likely. After receivers were told their sender's message (m1, m2 or m3) they chose an 
action (a i. a 2 or a 3 ) .  A period ended when the receiver picked an action and all results (type, 
message, action and payoff) were transmitted to both players. 
In each experimental session several games were played for 10 consecutive periods each. 
Subjects knew the payoff matrix on their screen was Hie s:m1e for everyone and would be used for 
the ten periods. Subjects were given history of their own paired plays, but not the entire cohort 
history of plays. An experimental session took two hours and lasted 30-50 periods; i.e., ten periods
each of three to five different games. Subjects had unlimited time to make decisions. Typically the 
first period of a new game took about five minutes to finish; later periods took one to two minutes 
each. Subjects earned $.25 for each payoff point minus $5.00. Their earnings averaged about 
$20.00. Payments were made privately at the end of each session 
Note that the equilibrium predictions which assume payoffs in Tables 1 through 8 are units 
of utility. To apply the predictions to our experiment requires a method for inducing risk neutrality 
(e.g., Roth and Malouf, 1979) or the assumption that subjects are risk neutral for gambles involving 
about a dollar. Since we share the reservations of many experimenters about the risk-induction 
procedure (e.g., Cox, Smith, and Walker, 1985) we simply assume risk neutrality.4 
b. Treatment Variables
We conducted 13 experimental sessions. Each session has two important learning variables. 
First, within an experimental session the sequence in which different games were played might affect 
learning. (Subjects were usually most confused and made fewer equilibrium choices in the first 
game in a session.) Second, we expect some learning across the ten plays of a given game. To 
check for sequence effects we varied the order in which the games were played in each session. 
Each game was played first in a session at least once. 
To distinguish behavior of subjects with different potential mathematical sophistication we 
used four subject pools. We ran experiments using students at the California Institute of Technology 
and the Universities of Arizona and Pennsylvania, and members of the technical staff at the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory. Table 9 lists the experiments we conducted. 
4. In most of the games the equilibria still hold under risk aversion unless subjects are sufficiently risk-averse that they
prefer a payoff of $.25n to an even gamble between 0 and $.25 (2n + I) (for 0,; n ,; 3). Studies of choice indicate subjects
are roughly risk neutral for bets of this size; e.g., Camerer (1988).
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Table 9: Experimental Design 
Experiment Number Subject Pool Sequence of Games 
1 Caltech 8,2,4,6 
2 Penn, Ph.D. 3,2,6,4 
3 Caltech* 1,3,4 
4 JPL* 2,8 
5 JPL 3,6,1,4,8 
6 Penn, undergrad.* 1,8 
7 Penr1, undergrad.* 6,8,2,3 
8 Caltech 4,8,6,l 
9 Arizona 1,4,1 
10 Penn, undergrad. 5,7.9,1 ** 
1 1  Penn. undergrad. 9,7,5,3 
12 Caltech 7,9,5,4** 
13 Caltech 9,5,7,6** 
* These sessions included an unreported game. ** These games were conducted for 20 periods.
NOTE: Game 9 is the same as Game 8 except that we rearranged the payoff matrix so that the op­
timal action for receivers was not the same for both equilibria. We made this change after observing 
the strength of the stable equilibrium in Game 8. However, the results were indistinguishable (see 
the logit analysis in Appendix A and Figures 1 and 2). Therefore, we will pool all data from Games
8 and 9. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
a. Nash Equilibrium Behavior
First we look at how often outcomes constitute a Nash-equilibrium message-action pair. 
Table 10 shows the proportion of Nash outcomes aggregated across all games. About two-thirds of
the outcomes are Nash. We can easily reject the hypothesis that choices are random and in most
games there is some convergence toward Nash outcomes between periods 1-5 and 6-10.5
5. There is also a slight sequence effect: The overall proportions of Nash outcomes in periods one through five and six
through ten for games played first in an experimental session were .64 and . 71. 
Periods 
1-5 
6-10 
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Table 10 - Frequency of Nash Outcomes 
Percent of Outcomes If first in Sequence 
66 
64 
70 
7 1  
Number of Obs 
645 
65 
645 
65 
However, the time series and summary statistics suggest the amount of Nash behavior is not 
consistent across games. Table 11 showns Nash and non-Nash behavior by game and refinement. 
The Bonferonni X2 statistics test the hypothesis that the proportions of Nash outcomes are equal in
all games. We cannot reject the equality hypothesis in periods 1-5 (X2 = 10.95, P = .19), but we can
reject it (X2 = 32.97, P = .01) in periods 6-10. 
The variation in amount of Nash play is hard to explain parsimoniously. Logit analyses of
the subject pool and learning variables (see Appendix B) suggest few systematic effects which can 
explain the variation in Nash play across games. Whether equilibria are unique appears helpful. 
Table 1 1  shows nearly 80% of the outcomes are Nash in later periods of games 1 and 2, but game 3 
has two equilibria and even more (95%) of the plays are Nash. Or one might conjecture there is less 
Nash play in higher-numbered games with deeper refinements, but games 6 through 8 yield more
Nash play than game 5. 
b. Refinement Results 
Table 11 shows the fraction of responses consistent with each refinement. There is a lot of 
non-Nash play, but there is also some tendency to choose the more refined equilibrium. That 
tendency also grows stronger between periods one to five and six to ten. The time series graphs of 
outcomes for each game are in Appendix C. 
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Table 11 
Contingency Table of Outcomes by Refinement 
Game Periods Proportion of Observed Outcomes 
More Less Sample 
Refined Refined Non-Nash Size 
Nash Non-Nash 
1 1 - 5  .56 .44 75 
6 � 10 .76 .24 75 
Nash Non-Nash 
2 1 - 5  .68 .32 75 
6 - 10 .81 .19 75 
Sequential Nash Non-Nash 
3 1 - 5  .63 .12 .25 60 
6 - 10 .73 .22 .05 60 
Intuitive Sequential Non-Nash 
4 1 - 5  .53 .13 .34 90 
6 - 10 .68 .03 .29 90 
Divine Intuitive Non-Nash 
5 1 - 5 .37 .22 .41 60 
6 - 10 .43 .10 .47 60 
U-Divine Divine Non-Nash 
6 1 - 5 .28 .32 .40 75 
6 - 10 .37 .32 .31 75 
NWBR U-Divine Non-Nash 
7 1-5 .30 .35 .35 60 
6 - 10 .20 .43 .37 60 
Stable NWBR Non-Nash 
8,9 1 - 5 .59 .13 .28 150 
6 - 10 .56 .06 .38 150 
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Since there is some change between periods 1-5 and 6-10 we ran some experiments for 20 
periods to see if convergence would continue in the additional ten periods. Table 12 summarizes the 
results. There is little additional convergence so we will discuss only the ten-period results. 
Game 
l 
3 
4 
6 
Table 12 
Proportion of Nash Outcomes in 20-Period Games 
Periods 
1-5 
6-10 
1 1-20 
1-5 
6-10 
1 1-20 
15 
6-10 
1 1-20 
1-5 
6-10 
1 1-20 
Proportions of Outcomes 
Nash Non-Nash 
.80 .20 
.73 .27 
.77 .23 
Sequential Nash 
.72 .14 
.93 .07 
.97 .00 
Intuitive Sequential 
67 .00 
.93 .00 
1.00 .00 
U-Divine Divine 
.27 .40 
.27 .40 
.23 .47 
Non-Nash 
.14 
.00 
.03 
Non-Nash 
.37 
.07 
.00 
Non-Nash 
.33 
.33 
.30 
We can observe convergence graphically by computing 95% confidence regions for the 
estimated probabilities of more refined, less refined, and non-Nash play (Pm• P1, Pn) in each game.
Since these probabilities add to one we can graph the confidence region for the three-dimensional 
vector in a two-dimensional simplex as in Figures 1 and 2. 6 (The confidence regions are the two­
dimensional analogue of one-dimensional confidence intervals.) With the figures one can do 
statistical tests at a glance. If the confidence region for a game lies completely above the dotted line 
in the upper-left half of the simplex where Pm > P1 , then we can reject the hypothesis that Pm = P1 
6. The confidence regions are based on the multinomial distribution ( see Queensberry and Hurst. 1964, and Snee, 1974).
Call the observed relative frequencies Fm,F1, andF11 and the population proportions P1,Pm• andP11• Call the sample sizeN 
and denote the 100(1- s) percentile of the chi-squared distribution with (2 degrees of freedom) by X. Then the 100(1- s) 
confidence region is the set of P1,Pm, andP, which satisfy (F;;tPm )+ (F,2!P1) + (F,'!Ph),; (X IN)+ 1.
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Figure 1: 
Confidence Regions for Outcome Proportions 
periods 1-5 
Pm = 1 
Pm > Pl 
Pm = Pl 
Pm < Pl 
Pn Pl = 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Pn = 
Figure 2: 
Confidence Regions for Outcome Proportions 
periods 6-1 O 
Pm = 
Pm > Pl 
/ .1 / 
Pm Pl 
Pm < Pl 
Pl = 
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at the 5 % level. 
In earlier periods (Figure 1) the confidence regions are centered near the middle of the 
simplex where more-refined and less-refined play are equally likely. But in later periods (Figure 2) 
the confidence regions for some games move toward the left edge of the triangle where Pz = 0 while 
games 6 and 7 stay near Pm = P1 and game 3 moves toward P n = 0. 
One is tempted to conclude that subjects simply converge toward more refined equilibria up 
to a point--games 6 and 7 and game 8 is an outlier. This interpretation is wrong because of the 
nesting of refinements. In game 4, for instance, 68 % of the outcomes in later periods correspond to
the intuitive criterion. But both equilibria in game 5 are intuitive (and hence sequential and Nash) 
and they are only played a total of 53% of the time. Thus the refinement which predicts well in 
game 4 works less well in game 5. (This is simply our point about !'-rash cutcomes-�t.11.eir frequency 
varies across games--extended to the refinements.) 
Similarly, the stable equilibrium is played 56% of the time in later periods of game 8. The 
nesting implies that in all other games the more refined equilibrium is stable and the less refined 
equilibrium is not, so every game is a test of stability. The stable equilibrium is played two-thirds of 
the time in games 3-4, but only a third of the time in games 5-7. 
Thus the frequency of play of various Nash refinements varies across games rather 
mysteriously just as Nash play does. One way to explain the variation is to examine sender 
messages and receiver actions separately. It might be that senders always choose the more-refined
equilibrium message, but receivers sometimes choose the best-response action from the less-refined 
equilibrium. (In our analysis so far such a message-action pair would be classified as a non-Nash 
outcome.) 
c. Sender Behavior
A sender in our sigualing games must make a decision knowing his type, but not knowing 
(with certainty) the reaction of his receiver counterpart. Except for game 2 all our equilibria require 
senders to pool -- ignore their type and choose the same message. 
Table 13 shows the proportion of sender messages by game and type in later rounds. Only 
10-20% of the messages are not Nash. However, there is a clear dependence of message choice on 
sender type in games 4 to 7, contrary to the pooling equilibrium prediction. For example, in game 4 
50% of the t 1 senders chose the intuitive message, but 90% of the t2 senders chose it.7 Brandts and 
Holt (1988) also observed type dependence in their experimental tests of the Cho-Kreps ( 1987) 
"beer-quiche" game which pits an intuitive equilibrium against an unintuitive one. 
7. The lo git model for sender messages in Appendix B suggests that: i) Ty pe dependence relative to the non-Nash Oess 
refined) message is game specific and significant in games l, 4, 5 and 7. ii) Subject pool and sequence have no sy stematic 
affect on the outcomes. Leaming is game specific; when it is significant it increases the probability of Nash message 
relative to non-Nash messages. 
Game 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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Table 13 
Proportions of Sender Messages by Type (t 1.t:z) for periods 6 - 10. 
Proportion of Observations 
Nash Non-Nash 
(.75,.95) (. 25,.05) 
Nash Non-Nash 
(. 94,. 90) (.06,. 10) 
Sequential Nash Non-Nash 
(.81b ,.76) (.19,.24) (. 00,. 00) 
Intuitive Sequential Non-Nash) 
(. 50,. 90b )* (.18b ,. 08) (. 32,. 02)* 
Divine Intuitive Non-Nash 
(.56,.54b) (.34b ,. 00)* (. 10,.46)* 
U-Divine Divine Non-Nash 
(. 37,.71)* (.50b ,. 29b) (.13,. 00)* 
NWBR U-Divine Non-Nash 
(. 28,. 52b )* (. 62b , . .48) (. 10,. 00) 
Stable NWBR Non-Nash 
(. 78b ,. 78b) (.09,. 04) (.12,.18) 
Sample 
Size 
(36,39) 
(33,42) 
(31,29) 
(40,50) 
(32,28) 
(38,37) 
(29,31) 
(72,78) 
* Rejection at the . 05 level of the hypothesis that conditional on the message being sent, the proba­
bility is equal for each type, against the alternative of unequal probabilities. 
b Denotes message which is best for the sender of each type, in equilibrum.
The equilibrium message which is better for (i.e., yields a higher payoff for) a particular 
sender type is marked with a superscript "b" in Table 13. Sender types generally choose the better­
for message, thought not always. Type-dependence occurs if one equilibrium is better for type one, 
the other equilibrium is better for type two, and senders choose which is better for their type. But 
even the better-for rule is sometimes violated, as in type two's in game 6. Type-dependence due to 
the better-for rule helps explain why sender play is game specific. Other decision rules might help 
explain deviations too. We considered several decision criteria: 8 
8. We considered several other decision criteria: Pareto-optimality, maximize-total-payoff (tacit cooperative strategy), and 
lexicographic preference for higher payoffs subject to minimizing payoff difference to reflect equity concerns. (The latter 
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n. Nash message
m. maximum message (maximizes sender's minimum payoff); see Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 278)
p. principle of insufficient reason (sender regards each receiver action as equally likely)
e. empirical-best response (selects message which is a best response to the message-dependent
actions that were actually played in periods six to ten). 
Table 14 shows the proportion of message choices by sender type along with letters marking 
which message is selected by each criterion. No criterion or pair of criteria accounts for deviations 
from Nash messages especially well. However, when all the criteria (including better-for, not shown 
here in Table 14) select a message then senders choose it more than 80% of the time. 
criterion often picks weakly-dominated strategies.) None of these criteria helped explain deviations from Nash. 
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Table 14 
Comparison of Sender Decision Rules Periods 6-10 
(Raw Data Messages) 
Type 
1 2 
Game m1 m2 m3 m1 m2 m3 
1 ne p m nmpe 
27 8 1 37 � 0 i ;, 
2 nmpe nmpe m 
31 1 1 2 38 2 
3 n* nmpe np nme 
5 0 26 7 0 22 
4 n nme mp nmpe n 
20 7 14 45 4 1 
5 np nme mp n ne 
3 12 17 13 0 15 
6 * * nmpe m ne nmpe n 
15 4 19 26 0 11 
7 e nmp n * np nme 
3 8 18 0 16 15 
8 nmpe n * nm nm mpe 
7 56 9 5 58 15 
* These strategies are weakly dominated if the sender eliminates the weakly dominated strategies
of the receiver.
d. Receiver Behavior
In our games once receivers get a message they must choose an action without knowing the 
sender's type with certainty. Table 15 shows the number of receiver actions for each possible 
message in periods six to ten. Decision-criteria-selection actions are marked with letters. We denote
the more-refined-message-action pairs by a box and the less-refined with a circle (deleting "n" 
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markings), adding "d" to denote a weakly-dominated action.9
Table 15 
Comparison of Receiver Decision Rule Periods 6-10 
m1 mz m3 
Game 
a1 a2 a3 a1 az a3 a1 a2 a3 
mpe d m m d pe mpe d d 
1 57 0 6 5 0 6 1 0 0 
e d pm mpe d m mpe d 
2 28 0 4 2 38 0 2 1 0 
d mpe m m pe d mpe d dm 
3 0 13 0 0 0 0 45 0 2 
mpe d mpe dm pe m 
4 2 63 0 14 0 4 7 0 0 
me p e mp mpe d 
5 4 11 1 0 5 6 29 4 0 
mpe mpe d mpe 
6 9 31 0 5 0 0 24 3 3 
m pe d pe m mpe 
7 2 0 1 12 2 10 3 26 4 
mpe mpe d mpe 
8 0 16 0 18 40 5 0 0 11 
Receivers rarely choose dominated actions. Their infrequency is a bit surprising because 
many of the actions are only dominated by mixed-strategy combinations of other actions. Also, 
receivers rarely choose actions if they are not empirical-best responses to messages.10
9. The Io git model for receiver actions in Appendix B suggests that; i) subject pool and sequence have no systematic effect,
ii) learning is game specific.
10. On the other hand, criteria "p" and "e" often coincide because the belief interval which makes an action a best response
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Given that a sender transmits an equilibrium message the receivers do chose equilibrium 
actions most of the time. It seems that the blame for non-Nash outcomes must rest mostly on the 
senders, and their tendency to separate in search of equilibrium payoffs that are better for each type. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
We conducted a series of experiments to test whether subjects chose refined subsets of Nash 
equilibria in signaling games. In the experiments a sender was privately informed of a randomly­
drawn type then chose a message. A receiver knew the message, but not the sender's type, and chose 
an action. Each game was repeated ten times with subjects randomly reassigned in pairs in each 
repetition. Two of the games had unique Nash equilibria. The six other games each had two 
equilibria one of which obeyed a more st_ri_rigent refinement criterion t.11.an the other. Our 
experimental design and treatments were ambitious and exploratory. 
We conducted 13 experiments with four subject pools. Our conclusions are as follows: 
a. About 70% of the message-action pairs gave Nash equilibrium outcomes. The frequency of 
Nash play differed across games. 
b. There was some tendency for subjects to choose the more refined equilibrium, but it depended 
on the specific game they played. No refinement predicted well in every game. 
c. Even though all games except one predicted pooling equilibria senders often chose different 
messages depending on their types (they separated). Senders tended to choose the equilibrium 
message which gave the better payoff for their type which often caused them to separate rather 
than pool. 
d. We tested whether several simple decision criteria such as minimax and principle of insufficient 
reason could explain why senders chose non-Nash and unrefined messages. No criterion 
worked very well, but when several criteria select to a particular message it was picked about 
90% of the time. 
There are two ways of thinking about equilibrium refinements. An extreme "logical" 
position is that refining is a search for an ideal set of formal rules which will refine the set of Nash 
equilibria to a single point in every game. "Intuitionists" take the opposite position, contending that 
refinements are useless because the plausibility of equilibria is self evident, varies across settings, 
and cannot be captured in a set of formal rules. The fact that refinements differ in accuracy across 
games supports the intuitionist position. Our results might be disheartening for logical-school 
theorists, but they suggest one positive lesson: Always check whether equilibria are consistent with 
decision criteria like minimax. If they are consistent with several appealing criteria they are more 
likely to be played. 
The game-specificity of refinement choices suggests further research should proceed in three 
directions: 
usually encompasses bothP (t1) = P (ti) = .5 (as the principle of insufficient reason assumes) and the empirically-observed 
:frequency of t 1. 
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(i) Simple refinements like sequentiality and the intuitive criterion predict fairly well in these and 
other experiments11 games could be constructed in which those refinements make implausible 
unappealing choices because they conflict with other decision criteria to put those refinements 
to a tougher test. 
(ii) Further work might suggest decision criteria which explain anomalous choices better than the 
several criteria we tried. It might help to gather more detailed data; e.g., one could measure 
subjects' beliefs and elicit contingent strategies (message choices for each possible type and 
actions for each possible message). 
(iii) Game-specificity of results suggest refinements should be studied in specific institutional 
settings of economic interest. For instance, the Spence (1974) signaling model would be 
interesting to experiment with because it permits a \Vide variety of equilibria and has been 
widely applied. The Milgrom and Roberts (1982b) limit-pricing model is interesting because 
an incumbent firm's type can be known to entrants and reputation building still occurs provided 
the incumbent's type is not commonly known. Other examples are easy to find. 
1 1 .  See Miller and Plott (1985); Brandts and Holt (1987); Cramerer and Weigelt (1988); Pitchik and Schotter (1988); 
Cadsby, et al (1989). 
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Appendix A 
Subject's Screen of Game Payoffs 
and Instructions 
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You are about to participate in an experiment designed to provide insight into certain 
features of decision processes. If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions, you 
might earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid in cash. 
The type of currency used in this marlcet is francs. All transactions will be in terms of
francs. Each franc is worth .25 dollars to you. At the end of the experiment 30 francs will be
subtracted from your total franc earnings. Your francs will then be converted into dollars at your 
specified rate, and you will be paid in dollars. 
All communication during the experiment will be done through your computer terminal.
The expedment will proceed as a series of periods during which you will make decisions and obtain 
earnings. 
At the beginning of a pedod each participant will be randomly paired with another 
participant in this experiment. Within each pair one individual will be assigned randomly as X and 
the other as Y. Each participant assigned as X in a pair will roll a die to determine their index. If the 
numbers 1 through 3 appear on the roll, the index will be I; if the numbers 4 through 6 appear, the 
index will be II. The actual value of the role will be X's own private information (the outcome of 
the roll will not be known to Y). 
The participant assigned as X will then make a selection (A, B or C). Participants assigned 
as X will indicate their selections by using the cursor and selecting one of the rows A, B or C. 
The participants assigned as Y will then be informed of the selection made by X, and then 
will choose one of the columns labeled D, E or F. Participants assigned as Y will indicate their 
selection by using the cursor key and selecting one of the columns D, E or F. 
Individual earnings from the selections will be determined from a Payoff Chart given to you 
each period. Each Payoff Chart specifies the amounts (in francs) X and Y will receive depending on
the choices made as well as the index. Suppose, for example, that the Payoff Chart had the 
following entries: 
Payoff Chart 
I II 
D E F D E F 
A 5,6 2,12 3,3 A 6,0 22,l 32,2 
B 8,1 4,13 1,12 B 0,1 2 2,32 0,0 
c 21,6 0,0 15,l c 4,2 21,3 2,23 
The first entry in each cell in the Payoff Chart is the amount to be received by X and the second 
entry is the amount to be received by Y. For example, under index I the cell B, F shows a potential 
earning of 1 francs for X and 12 francs for Y. 
Individual earnings for each period will be determined as follows. Each participant assigned 
as X will be informed of their index and will be asked to make selection of A, B or C. The paired 
participant assigned as Y will then be informed of X's choice but not the index. Y will then make a 
choice of D, E or F. The index will then be announced to Y and Y choice will be announced to X. 
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Given the choices made by the paired participants, individual earnings will be calculated and hi­
lighted on your screen. For example, suppose the Payoff Chart were as above and the paired 
participant assigned as X selected the letter C and the paired participant assigned as Y selected the 
letter D. If the index was I then the earnings for X would be 21 and the earnings for Y would be 6. 
If the index was II the earnings for X would be 4 and the earnings for Y would be 2. 
In review, the process is as follows: 
1. At the beginning of a period, you will be paired randomly with another participant.
2. You will be assigned randomly as either X or Y.
3. You will be given a Payoff Chart.
4. Each individual assigned as X will roll a die to determine their index.
5. Each X participant will make a choice of ."-., B or C.
6. Each individual assigned as Y will be informed of X's selection and will make a selection of D,
E or F (without knowing the index).
7. The index and selection of participants will be announced.
8. Earnings are calculated and placed in your Record of Earnings Sheet.
Feel free to earn as much as you can. Are there any questions? 
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Appendix B 
Logit Estimates for Games, Sender, 
and Receiver Responses 
30 
Recall we have used various subject pools, have played the game for several periods, and 
have played the games in various sequences. To check for these effects across the games we 
estimate the following unordered logit model for each game. 
Prob (Y; = Non-Nash [Less ])/Prob(Y; = More) = a 0 + b 1 * a; + b 2 * j; 
where: a = dummy for Arizona subject pool 
j = dummy for JPL subject pool 
p = dummy for Penn subject pool 
t = period play of game 
s = sequence play of the game 
g = game 9 dummy for row change 
Thus, subject pool estimates are relative to the Caltech subject pool. Table 4 supplies the estimates 
of the model for each game and joint hypothesis test. The standard error of the estimates is in 
parentheses. 
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Logit Estimates for Treatments 
P(NonNash)/P(More) 
Game'Coefficients 
ao b1 b2 b3 b4 bs b6* 
1 -0.35 0. 35** 0.39 1 . 04** 0.1 77** 0. 24 na 
(0. 64) (.577) (. 492) (. 558) (. 0065) (0.1 8) 
2 2.1 2 -1 . 05 -0.44 1 . 9  0.1 56** -0.87 na 
(1 . 32) (0. 86) (0. 90) (0. 62) (0.007) (0.61) 
3 0. 1 4 na -0. 05 0.37 -0. 26** - . 34 na 
(0. 94) (0. 86) (0.74) (0. 1 1) (0. 26) 
4. -0.81 -0. 1 5  - 0. 61 -0.67 -0.05 0. 22 na 
(0.77) (0.48) (0. 63) (0. 63) (0.06) (0. 26) 
5 1.41 na na -0.54 -. 0001 - 0. 46 na 
(0. 83) (0.42) (.071) (0.27) 
6 - 2. 1 0  na 1 . 26 1 . 1 6** --- 0.1 0 0.75** na 
(1 .07) (0. 80) (0.60) (. 07) (.276) 
7 -1 . 72 na na -0.1 95 0. 1 07 0. 79** na 
(0. 92) (0. 50) (.087) (0. 356) 
8 -0. 62 na 0.70 -0. 632 0.03 - .07 - .07 
(0. 46) (0. 71) (0. 52) (.046) (0.1 9) ( . 3) 
* 1his is the estimate for the column change in game 8 (game 9) 
** Significant at . 1 0 level (Bonferroni Joint Hypothesis test) 
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P(Less)/P(More) 
Game'Coefficients 
ao b 1  b 2 b3 b4 bs b 6 
3 -0.21 na -2. 42** -1.07 0.11 --0. 47 na 
(0. 91) (0. 89) (0.56) (0.10) (0.29) 
4 1.46 1.15 3.34** 2.98 -0.24** -1. 27** na 
(1.03) (0.48) (1.63) (1. 66) (0.11) (0.56) 
5 1.07 na na 0.77 -0.22** -0.63 na 
(1.10) (0.64) (.10) (0.56) 
6 --0.57 na 1. 49** -0.72 0.05 -- 0.06 na 
(1. 26) (0.77) (0.75) (.07) (0.33) 
7 -- 0.51 na na 0.18 0.124 0.11 na 
(0,83) (0. 48) (. 083) (0. 35) 
8 -1.541 **  na 0. 56 -1.95** - 0.10 0.16 0.08 
(0.62) (0.89) (0.72) (.065) (0.24) (.5) 
For the senders we estimate the following Logit model: 
Prob (Y; = Refinement)/Prob (Y; =Non-Nash) = b0* c; + b 1*a; + b 2*}; + b3*p; + b4* t; + bs* s; + 
b6*g; + b1*z; 
where: c = dummy for Caltech subject pool 
a = dummy for Arizona subject pool 
j = durmny for JPL subject pool 
p = durmny for Penn subject pool 
t = period play of game 
s = sequence play of the game 
g = durmny for game 8 and 9 
z = dummy for type = 1, 2 
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Logit Estimates for Treatments 
P(Less )/P(N on-Nash) 
Game 'Coefficients 
ho b r bz b3 b4 bs b6 b1 
1 -1.88 -1.06 -1.85 -1.20 0.234 0. 328 na 1. 59
(0. 77) (0. 94) (0. 97) (0. 72) (. 0765) (021) (0. 45) 
2 -1.57 - 0. 15 0.28 -2.83 0.128 1. 82 na -.25 
(2. 42) (1. 39) (1.45) (2. 54) (0. 11) (1. 12) (0. 60) 
3 -11.2 na 6. 011 5.633 -9. 0 -4. 45 na -11.61 
(486. 0) (627.0) (482. 6) (61. 5) (139.1) (258. 0) 
4 1. 52 1.039 4.87 2. 91 . 090 -0. 73 na -. 036 
(1.10) (1 . 93) (1.75) (1. 09) (. 097) (0. 40) (0.66) 
5 - 0. 913 na na 2.31 -0.16 0.17 na -4.23 
(1.24) (1. 09) (0. 10) (0. 40) (1. 11) 
6 - 0.64 na -1.34 -0.13 0.28 - 0. 11 na 12. 39
(1. 68) (1.26) (l .09) (0. 11) (0. 44) (74.6) 
7 14.06 na na 10. 65 0.139 -4. 71 na 1.34 
(73. 6) (49.1) (0.14) (24. 54) (1. 13) 
8 - 0. 94 na -1.14 -.016 -.086 0. 72 - .4 . 006 
(0.75) (0. 85) (1.13) (. 077) (0. 31) (.5) (0. 44) 
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P(More)/P(Non-Nash) 
Game'Coefficients 
bo b 1 b2 h b4 bs b5 b7 
3 0. 19 na 1.89 1.212 -.07 0. 47 na --0.53 
(0.85) (0.73) (0.55) (. 084) (0.28) (0.48) 
4 -. 07 -.04 1.81 0. 56 0. 196 --0.24 na 2.27 
(1.12) (1. 03) (1. 90) (1. 69) (1. 03) (. 090) (0. 56) 
5 --0.63 na na -.058 -.019 0.71 na --0.45 
(1. 03) (0.92) (. 084) (0. 32) (0. 49) 
6 1.01 na 1.17 --0.32 0.29 --0.54 na 11. 08
(1. 07) (0. 80) (0. 60) (0.07) (.276) (74.6) 
7 14. 57 na na 10. 70 --0.012 -4.63 na 2. 13
(0.92) (0.50) (0. 087) (0. 356) (1. 12) 
8 0.36 na 0.40 --0. 57 0.057 0.70 -.58 .047 
(0. 58) (0. 65) (0. 92) (. 060) (0.27) (0. 3) (0. 37) 
For the receivers we estimate the following Logit model: 
Prob (Y;= Refinement)/Prob Y,= Non-Nash) = b0*c, + b 1*a, + b2*j, + b3*p, + b4*t, + bs*s, 
+ b5*gi + b1*z l; + bs*z2; 
where: c = dummy for Caltech subject pool 
a = dummy for Arizona subject pool 
j = dummy for JPL subject pool 
p = dummy for Penn subject pool 
t = period play of game 
s = sequence play of the game 
zl  = dummy for less refined message sent 
z2 = dummy for more refined message sent 
g = dummy for game 8 and 9 
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P(More)/P(Non-Nash) 
Game 'Coefficients 
bo b 1 b2 b3 b4 bs b7 bs 
3 0. 19 na 1.88 1.21 - 0.071 0. 47 -0.5 37 1. 15 
(0.85 4) (0.7 27) (0.5 48) (0.084) (0. 28) (0. 45) (0. 80) 
4 -8.86 -9.5 0 -6.24 -5.51  -0.25 -1.26 11. 96 12. 05 
(91.5) (80. 3) (62.5) (37 .1) (0.21) (0.5 6) (61.7) (57.5) 
5 0. 40 na na 0.94 -0.18 -0.95 5. 28 -10.19 
(1.79) (1. 61) (0.15) (0.56) (1.59) (7 2. 37) 
6 -2.08 na 1.71 3. 33 0.32 0.45 1.63 2. 62 
(1.11) (2.51) (2.76) (0. 48) (0. 66) (1. 21) (1.34) 
7 -4.97 na na -4. 42 0. 22 0. 35 2.13 1. 62 
(1. 69) (1.72) (0.11) (0.39) (1. 35) (1.19) 
8 4. 46 na 4. 88 4.11 - 0.19 - 0.54 0. 006 -2.86 
(1.14) (1.23) (1.38) (0.087) (0. 34) (1.15) (0.577) 
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P(Less)JP(Non-Nash) 
Game 'Coefficients 
1 -3.93 -3.76 -2.49 9.70 -9. 08 .08 -11.005 na 
(956. 46) (691.31) (859. 11) (250.209) (67.53) (240.908) (181.13) 
2 -3.12 -1.19 -0.49 -0.32 0.067 0.29 -2.23 na 
(l .30) (0.79) (0.93) (0.71) (0.08) (0.23) (0.53) 
3 -11.20 na 6.01 5.63 - 8.99 4.45 -11.61 2.27 
(486.0) (62.7) (48. 7) (61.5) (139.7) (257.7) (63.3) 
4 -9.631 -8.40 -5.62 --4.94 -0.10 -1.528 9.528 16.91 
(92.7) (91.1) (82.1) (78.1) (0.14) (0.88) (90.88) (29.7) 
5 2.07 na na 1.84 -0. 003 -0. 4 1.26 -2.22 
(1.04) (0.95) (0. 009) (0.323) (l .16) (0.54) 
6 1.07 na 1.01 -3.06 0.005 0.501 2.72 0.676 
(1.86) (2.33) (4.56) (0.90) (1.39) (0.96) (1.07) 
7 -2.07 na na -2.01 - 0.009 0.201 4.72 0.98 
(1.56) (1. 62) (0.10) (0.39) (1. 266) (1.71) 
8 4.02 na 2.95 3.73 -0.18 -0.20 1.51 -0.68 
(3.78) (4.15) (5. 13) (0.91) (0.45) (2.10) (1.11) 
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Appendix C 
Cohort and Time Series of 
Outcomes by Game 
Note: The cohort number at the bottom of each histogram are tl1e experiment numbers used in
Table 9 of the text. The letters above each stacked bar is the related subject pool where: 
A = University of Arizona 
c - Caltech 
J - JPL 
p "' University of Pennsylvania 
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